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On May 29, 1986, the Los Angeles County Bar Association
and Town Hall of California sponsored a debate at the Biltmore
Hotel in Los Angeles on the resolution: "That all justices of the
California Supreme Court appearing on the November 1986
ballot should be retained." The Supreme Court Project is proud
to publish in this Backgrounder the transcript of that lively,
informative encounter.
A much larger debate has been raging, of course, throughout
California for more than a year about the state Supreme Court
and November's judicial elections. The Biltmore meeting was
unusual, however, in bringing together four exceptionally
well-informed and articulate spokesmen for and against
changing the membership of the Court next November. Gerald
F. Uelmen, dean of the Law School at Santa Clara University,
and Steven H. Shiffrin, law professor at the University of
California, Los Angeles, Law School, argued for retention of all
the justices on the ballot.
Phillip E. Johnson - familiar to Backgrounder readers as the
author of The Court on Trial, also published by The Supreme
Court Project - and Stephen R. Barnett, both law professors at
the University of California's Boalt Hall School of Law at
Berkeley, opposed retention of Chief Justice Rose Bird
"The existence," Professor Uelmen said at the Biltmore, "of a
serious debate about the retention of Supreme Court justices is
unprecedented in California." That debate involves many of the
most important issues confronting the citizens not only of
California, but of the entire United States. To choose wisely in
November, voters must consider those issues thoughtfully and
carefully. The Biltmore Debate will help them do so.
We wish to thank the Los Angeles County Bar Association,
Town Hall and the four debate participants for making possible
this Supreme Court Project publication of The Biltmore Debate.
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Who's Telling the Truth?
Once again, through a strained and unrealistic statutory construction,
the majority has thwarted the obvious intent of the framers of, and voters
for, Proposition 8 [The Victims' Bill of Rights].
- California Supreme Court Justices
Malcolm Lucas and Stanley Mosk
in a recent dissent.
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If I couldn't follow the law, I wouldn't sit here.
- Chief Justice Rose Bird, quoted the
day after the Proposition 8 decision
was handed down.
Who is right? Have Supreme Court decisions strayed from following
the clear intent of the law? Or are the controversies involving California's
Supreme Court merely disagreements as to what the law really means?
To answer these questions, The Supreme Court Project is publishing the
research, ideas and opinions of California's top experts on the major
issues involved in the 1986 judicial elections.
The Supreme Court Project's purpose is to provide opinion makers,
educators, the business community and ordinary Californians with timely
and concise, yet thorough, information on these critical issues. Our
Backgrounders are designed to insure that responsible voices are heard
throughout· California in the public debate on our state's highest court.
They emphasize up-to-date research and analysis on the most important
questions of the day.
Phillip E. Johnson's The Court on Trial, our first Backgrounder,
published last December, has been widely read and deba~ed in
California's law schools, among judges and practicing attorneys, at
public fora and in the news media. The Court on Trial figures
prominently, as it happens, in the discussions we transcribe here. It's
publication helped bring about the debate reproduced in this volume.
Readers who wish to obtain a copy of The Court on Trial, or additional
copies of The Biltmore Debate, should contact The Supreme Court
Project directly (please see back cover for our address). To help cover
our printing and mailing costs, we request a $2 donation for The Court
on Trial and $4 for The Biltmore Debate.
The Supreme Court Project was founded in 1985 as a nonpartisan
organization dedicated to publishing research relevant to California's
1986 judicial elections. Individuals, corporations, companies and
political committees are eligible to support the Project through their
donations.
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This volume contains the transcripts of a one-hour debate on the
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Gerald F. Uelmen
Opening Statement:

THE

EXISTENCE of a serious debate about the retention of
Supreme Court justices is unprecedented in California. But
controversial judges who write controversial opinions are not
unprecedented in California. In 1966, Chief Justice Roger Traynor was
roundly condemned for concurring in an opinion holding that an
initiative that declared that Californians have the right to discriminate on
the basis of race in the sale of their property was unconstitutional. 1
Chief Justice Traynor was retained by a vote of 62 percent in 1966, at
that time the smallest vote of affirmation ever received by a justice of the
Supreme Court.
In 1974, Chief Justice Donald Wright was condemned for his
opinion declaring the death penalty unconstitutional. 2 He was confirmed
by a rate of 70 percent. The suggestion that Traynor or Wright be
removed as Chief Justice of California was hardly taken seriously by
responsible politicians or scholars. What's different about 1986? The
most significant difference is that in 1966 and 1974 the governor who
appointed Chief Justice Traynor and Chief Justice Wright was still in
office. In 1986, the contest is fueled by the prospect of a political
opportunity to reshape the Court drastically.
Let's not kid ourselves about why millions of dollars are being spent
on a mail and media campaign: to create three vacancies on the
California Supreme Court and three opportunities to change the results
in decided cases.
As the affirmative in this debate, we contend that the current
campaign threatens two fundamental principles of an independent
judiciary: first of all, Supreme Court justices should not be politically
accountable for the results of their decisions and, secondly, political
philosophy should not be considered in evaluating the performance of
justices. I'm going to focus on these two premises because I suspect
that it is here we will disagree most sharply in today's debate. The
1
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reason I suspect that is because I've read Professor Johnson's
Backgrounder paper [Supreme Court Project Backgrounder The Court
on Trial, by Phillip E. Johnson, who is also the fourth participant in
this debate] - I've even read the footnotes. And it's quite clear that he
believes the results of the Court's decisions are relevant, particularly the
death penalty decisions. He also apparently feels that political
philosophy is highly relevant since he frequently refers to particular
justices as "liberals" or "liberal activists" and defines the symbolic
importance of this contest as a test of public acceptance of judicial
activism. I sincerely hope that at some point in this debate Professor
Johnson will favor us with a definition of just what a "liberal activist"
judge is and whether he would advocate the removal of all liberal
activist judges; if not, which ones? We'll be waiting with bated breath
for the answer.
Now let me turn to our first principle: that Supreme Court justices
should not be politically accountable for the results of their decisions.
There are three cogent reasons why the results of decisions should be
disregarded.
First , because holding justices politically accountable for the results
of. their decisions will inevitably produce result-oriented justice. By
usmg box scores to evaluate them, we're delivering a very strong
subliminal message to the justices. We're saying: before you vote, you
better think about how this result will look on the six o'clock news or
in tom?rrow's newspaper headlines. And that message directly
contradicts the message that we deliver in the California Code ofJudicial
Conduct: "A judge must be unswayed by partisan interests, public
clamor, or fear of criticism." 3 In 1982, a senatorial candidate
announced that he would urge the defeat of justices if they voted to
strike down Proposition 8. In 1986, the governor announced he was
waiting to reveal his position on certain justices until he saw the results
in pending death penalty cases. It has quickly become part of the
political terrain in California to use support or opposition in retention
elections in not so subtle attempts to influence pending cases. That, I
submit, is an inevitable result of holding justices politcally accountable
·
for the results of their decisions.
The second reason why results should be ignored is that the removal
of. a ~ustice has no effect on those results. If we truly respect the
pnnc1ple of stare decisis, we don't set out to change decisions by
changing the justices. There's a name for that process: it's called court
packing. We have a more direct remedy available to reverse unpopular
decisions. By legislation or constitutional amendment we can overrule
decisions that we disagree with. In 1982, with the enactment of
Proposition 8, we did precisely that. The Court subsequently upheld
the constitutionality of Proposition 8, thus officiating at the interment of
50 of its own precedents. 4
The third reason that results should not be considered is simple
fairness. Very few of the complex issues that we ask the Court to
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resolve every year are clear-cut. Unanimous opinions have become the
exception rather than the rule, and competent justices will be found on
both sides of nearly every issue presented to the Court.
The results really tell us very little about a justice's competence, but
results are susceptible to distortion and misrepresentation in a political
campaign. No better example of that can be offered than the death
penalty cases which have unfortunately become the centerpiece of the
anti-retention campaign. The Court's record in death penalty cases is
simplistically reduced to a box score: 51 to three in favor of the
criminals, as though the only issue the Court were deciding was
whether to favor vicious criminals or hapless victims. In reality, every
death penalty case involves a complex review of three factual
determinations: the finding of guilt of first-degree murder, which the
Court has affirmed at a rate of 67 percent, the finding of special
circumstances, which the Court has affirmed at a rate of 75 percent
under the 1977 death penalty law and 25 percent under the Briggs
Initiative, and finally, the choice of death over life without parole,
affirmed at a rate of 25 percent under the 1977 law, zero under the
Briggs Iniative.
There are two startling things about these results. They demonstrate
that the real problem is the sloppy draftsmanship of Briggs rather than
any hidden agenda of the Court. And the vast majority of reversals have
simply been remands for new hearings because the jury was improperly
instructed pursuant to the Briggs Initiative. Murderers are not being
turned loose in our streets. The effort to turn the retention election
campaign into a referendum on the death penalty is simply a crass
attempt to turn public ignorance and fear to political advantage. That
too, I submit, is an inevitable consequence of holding justices
politically accountable for the results of their decisions.
Let me turn to our second fundamental premise: that political
philosophy should not be considered in evaluating the performance of
justices. Clearly, political philosophy is not ignored when justices are
appointed. Liberal governors tend to appoint liberal justices, just as
conservative governors tend to appoint conservatives. We've been
blessed, or cursed, with both in California on a regurlarly recurring
basis.
Once we start using the retention elections to remove the liberals
during conservative eras, or the conservatives during liberal eras,
we've added a new ingredient which seriously threatens the
constitutional mixture. It's no answer to suggest that their philosophy
renders justices unfit because they are biased, especially if our goal is
simply to replace them with justices with the opposite bias. Ultimately,
we must recognize that political philosophy is qualitatively different
from that kind of bias that renders a judge unfit.
I've never heard a lawyer go into court and make a motion to
disqualify the judge because the judge was too liberal, or too

4
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conservative. Yet today, for the first time, we are hearing a serious
suggestion that judges be removed from office because they are "too
liberal." We contend that the political philosophy of the justices is just
as irrelevant as the results of their decisions. Thank you.
(Applause)

Notes
1. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Ca1.2d 529 (1966).

2. People v. Anderson, 6 Ca1.3d 628 (1972).
3. California Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A)(1).
4. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal.3d 236 (1982); in Re Lance W., 37
Cal.3d 873 (1985).

FIRST, A point logic. In taking the negative on the proposition
all the justtces on the ballot should be retamed, I am not necessarily
asserting, of course, that none of them should be retained. In fact, my
position is that only
Justice Bird should not be retained. I can't
speak for Professor Johnson, but I plan to vote for all the other justices
on the ballot.
In explaining why I oppose retention of Chief Justice Bird, I want to
try to address in my opening and rebuttal remarks - and this may require
some fast talking - three issues.
First, I will talk about California's election system for the retention of
Supreme Court justices. In particular, I will consider whether the
framers of the state constitution necessarily made a mistake in not
providing life tenure instead, a mistake that the voters should try to
remedy at the polls by voting automatically for the retention of any
justice on the ballot.
Second, I will discuss what I think is the appropriate standard to
apply in deciding whether to vote against a justice, and in particular a
chief justice.
Third, I will apply that standard to Chief Justice Bird with respect to
one telltale case.
The main argument for retaining Chief Justice Bird appears to be, not
that she has performed effectively as Chief Justice, not that she has
demonstrated the impartiality, the fair-mindedness, the good judgment
required of the Chief Justice of California, not that she has earned the
respect and trust that the people of California ought to have in their
Chief Justice. The argument appears to be, rather, in the actual words
of the Sacramento Bee editorial endorsing reconfirmation, that Chief
Justice Bird and her colleagues "have committed no crimes and done
nothing to violate their oaths."
An affirmative vote is therefore required, the argument goes, in L"le
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name of judicial independence. The alternative is said to be "Gallup Poll
justice," or I suppose in California we ought to say "Field Poll justice."
Professor Uelmen has talked about result-oriented justice. Justice
Reynoso reportedly stated recently, "It would be a tragedy if any justice
is not reconfirmed because the justices would then have to look at who
has political power and money and not at the Constitution."
Judicial independence is, of course, a legitimate and important
concern, it deserves emphasis that
concern. In response to
California constitution, though it does not provide life tenure, does
afford spacious protection for judicial independence. The constitution
provides for a special type of election for appellate judges, an election
in which the judge runs on his or her record against nobody, and in
which the next governor - not the electorate, and not a governor whose
identity is known at the time of the election - appoints the replacement
for a defeated justice.
The system also provides for lengthy terms of 12 years. While
appointments to unfinished terms often shorten a justice's initial term unfortunately, in my view- Chief Justice Bird has had nine years since
her appointment in 1977.
These lengthy terms protect judicial independence in at least two
ways.
One way operates in the justice's own mind. I find cause for wonder
in all these assertions that if justices face the risk of non-retention after a
term on the California Supreme Court, they will be led to decide cases
not by looking to the constitution and to their consciences, but to who
has money and political power. Is this not, as Professor Gideon
Kanner has pointed out recently, a slur on the integrity and the
commitment to principle of the men and women on the California
bench? Are California's justices really so afraid of being thrown out
into the harsh world after 12 years on the California Supreme Court that
they would forsake their oaths and their consciences, and pander to
public whims, in order to avoid it? I think not.
The other way lengthy terms protect the justices operates in the minds
of the voters. Twelve years, or, in the case of Chief Justice Bird, nine
years, is a long time. It is long enough for the public to forget many
things that might be held against a justice. In Chief Justice Bird's case,
for example, it is long enough for apparently everyone in the state to
have forgotten her disastrous act in 1978 in calling for an investigation
of the Supreme Court as a result of the election-day article on the
Tanner 1 case in the Los Angeles Times. This was an act not only of
monumental poor judgment on Chief Justice Bird's part, but of
arrogance as well, since she did it without consulting the other
Supreme Court justices.
The resulting investigation was a catastrophe for the Supreme Court,
shattering to its judicial image and public respect, debilitating to its
self-confidence and internal spirit. It was very possibly the worst thing
to happen to the Court in its entire history (Chief Justice Bird's own
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apfJOHltment possibly excepted).
not understand why this monumental error, this act of poor
judgment
arrogance that did so
damage to the institution
entrusted to her leadership, is not itself a sufficient ground for denying
Chief Justice
a second term. But, as I say, eight years is a long
and nobody but me seems even to remember.
system thus provides
protection for judicial
•u"''"~-'"u'""'J'"'"'· Under this system no
justice has ever been
defeated. Even
despite
opposition and
provocation for the
polls show that the justices other than Chief
Justice Bird are running well ahead of their nay-sayers.
But the
the state constitution
not provide the ultimate in
judicial independence, life tenure. Was this simply a regrettable error on
their part? I would like to suggest some reasons why it may not have
been.
In the first place,
question is not whether life tenure for judges is a
good or bad thing in general. We have life tenure in this country for
federal judges. I myself think that is a good thing, but in any event it is
a fact, and there is no serious proposal to change it. The question for
then, is whether it was a mistake to deny life tenure to
in a system that does give life tenure to federal judges.
constitutional rights are protected by the ultimate
~-'"'''uu,w......, that life tenure provides. Hence many of the
,....,,TY'i"'"t" one hears in this campaign, to the effect that constitutional
will
in jeopardy if California's justices are denied reelection,
arguments are simply beside the point.
Then, given that constitutional rights are protected by the life tenure of
federal judges, there may be sound reasons for the public's desire,
manifested in all but two or three states, to keep state court judges on a
shorter leash. A state court like the California Supreme Court in
important ways has more discretionary power, more power to create
more law that has more impact on people's lives, than even the United
States Supreme Court.
First, state courts, unlike federal courts, can make common law. This
is, of course, a very expansive domain. Many of the most criticized
decisions of the California Supreme Court have been common law
decisions - the Court's famous tort decisions, for example, or the
for public employees.2
decision last year creating a right to
..., .... , ....,ll'u. the state statutes that state courts interpret cover a broader
and deeper expanse
human activities than federal statutes do. The
California Unruh Act, for example, applies to "all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever." 3
Third, and most relevant here - regarding the case that I hope to refer
to - state courts, unlike federal courts, have as one of their major
functions the refereeing of state politics. The California Supreme Court
does this, for example, in its frequent decisions holding ballot initiatives
valid or invalid, or in
reapportionment decisions that can determine
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Notes
1. People v. Tanner,

Cal.3d 16

I, 1978).

2. County
No. 2 v. Los
38 Ca1.3d 564 ( 1985).
3.
Code Section 51. See, e.g., Isbister v. Boys'
Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 72 (1985).
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FIRST became involved in events like this when I got a call from
Jerry Uelmen, my former debate partner in college. He called me up
and asked if I had "signed the petition on behalf of the California
Supreme Court?" I asked, "What petition?" He said, "It's going all
around U.C.L.A. Haven't you signed this petition?" I said, "Jerry, I
d.on't kno~. what Y.ou're talking about." He said, "Well, would you
s1gn a peutwn saymg that you are in favor of the reelection of the
Court?" I said, "Sure." He said, "Good, then can you be down here
Monday morning for a press conference in which we announce the
results?" I said, "All right. I'll come."
[At the press conference] we announced that 255law professors in the
state were supporting the reelection of the Court. A "point of logic" w~ kne.w that each ju.stice on the ballot would be supported by what we
smd. Smce then, I thmk, the number has grown to 287. The other side
has at least two law professors in public [Phillip Johnson and Stephen
Ba~ett]: ~ideon Kanner here today is a third. They have yet to get
the1r pet1t1on of the law professors on the other side. We're waiting.
There had been television cameras at the press conference and I
thought, if I'm going to be on television, I ought to look at it. When I
went home, here's what I saw on the various channels. I saw myself or
Jerry pronouncing some half-sentence about the independence of the
Court. Then on each of the television channels I saw Ross Johnson a
state legislator, who had gone out that day to a pond, with ducks
quacking in the background.
(Laughter)
It was marvelous television. At his press conference, Johnson talked
about a brutal murder of two young boys. He said the two little boys
wouldn't be able to come there to hear the ducks quack, but "thanks to
the Court" the person who had killed those boys might one day be able
to hear those ducks.
9
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of
on television and on radio. That is what they covered.
No one thought to ask what the issue in the case 1 was. I mean - did the
California Supreme Court decide to let Mr. Memro have a reversal of
the judgment on the ground that there were ducks quacking and this
was a brutal murder? No.
The public does not yet know what the issue in that case was because
~he broadcasters, the television people, the politicians and the special
~nterests have been unwilling to talk about
The politicians and special
mterests don't want that to be discussed. It is an indication, I think, of
why this is a unique election. This is a unique election because, despite
Professor Barnett's abstract discussion of the state constitution, this is
the first election in the history of the state of California in which
politicians and special interest groups have spent millions of dollars in
an effort to influence its outcome. This is the first election in which
corporations, insurance companies, banks and agribusiness have
invested large sums in an effort to pack the Court.
~ecent~y,_ a farm group - the Farm Bureau -pledged $100,000 to
Cnme Vtcttms for Court Reform [a campaign committee seeking the
defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird and of Justices Cruz Reynoso and
Joseph Grodin]. If you think the Farm Bureau is worried about the
death penalty cases, I submit that you might have mis-analyzed the
politics.
(Laughter)
Agribusiness wants new justices to make decisions about collective
bargaining for workers and about the impact of agribusiness's activity
on the safety and quality of the environment. Those are the kinds of
things they are really interested in. But the ads will be talking about the
death penalty cases.
Professor Barnett says that the state constitution authorizes all this.
But the state constitution does not tell you how to vote in this election.
The state constitution allows you to decide that you do not want to have
a campaign, now or in the future, in which the justices of the California
Supren:e Court are going to be subjected to the kinds of misleading and
deceptive attacks that have occurred. In other words, if you want to
have elections in the future in which judges are looked at in terms of
whether they are pro-environment or anti-environment liberal or
. you can vote to get rid of any particular justice
' you like.
conservative,
That _would be a signal to the politicians and the special interest groups
that m the future they can affect elections by pouring in millions of
dollars.
If you want to tell the politicians and the special interest groups to lay
off the Court, to use their money, power and influence in the
Legislature, but_kee~ o_ne branch of government independent of money,
power and publtc optmon, then what you do is you reelect the justices.
Now it is a bit difficult to respond to Professor Barnett's remarks.
For one thing, they are, I believe, laced with contradictions. He first
tells you that since there are very long terms, it takes an elephant's
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memory to remember things and that everyone
forget. He then
stands up and announces that Chief Justice Bird is arrogant, that
everyone else has forgotten (but he remembers) that she didn't \.-U111>uu
with people and called for a public investigation of the Court, that this
was outrageous, so forth and so on.
Well, everyone has not forgotten. There is a book called Framed: The
New Right Attack on Chief Justice Rose Bird and the Courts, by Betty
Here's what she says about that issue:
[Bird's] request for the investigation would itself become a
Bird
source
controversy .... Some of the justices were
realizes her lack of consultation is a justifiable criticism. But at the time
she wrote the letter [requesting the investigation], it was obvious that at
least some of the accusations being made against the court were being
made from within. It was obvious the documents that were released to
establish false or half-truthful impressions probably were being
released by a Supreme Court justice, for no one else had access to
them. She thought it unlikely those people would want an investigation
of the court."
I think her failure to consult, in Catholic theology, might be regarded
as a venial sin.
(Laughter)
That there was a public investigation of the Court, given the very
serious charges being made, it seems to me was a good thing. And it
seems to me that it is best that the truth be aired. I challenge Professor
Barnett to come back up here and explain to us why these matters
should be kept in private.
Secondly, Professor Barnett tells us that it's O.K. to vote against
justices on the basis of results. He has one "telltale" case - he runs out
of time, conveniently, not letting us know what the telltale case is.
(Laughter)
And he says, not to worry, the federal courts are there, and the federal
courts protect federal rights; therefore, the independence of the courts is
not at stake. Without even finishing the sentence, he goes on to tell us
about all the other things the California courts do, the vital and
important issues that affect our lives. My response to that is this:
independence of the courts doesn't mean just federal constitutional
rights. Independence of the courts means that the courts decide cases on
the merits before them; that they are not, in environmental cases, going
to be worried about whether or not agribusiness will be giving
contributions against them, or, on the other side, whether liberal
Democratic groups are going to be campaigning against Lucas and
Panelli, claiming in the next election that they're "in bed with toxic
polluters" or something like that. That's the kind of election we're
going to have in the future if you allow this to continue.
Independence of the courts means that justices ought to make
decisions without worrying about being taunted with the suggestion that
they're responsive to contributions. A prime example of this particular
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does

say? He says,

will necessarily
be aware that
are not necessarily disinterested. Chief Justice Bird has
campaign funds primarily from the trial lawyers who
representing injured persons in lawsuits. These lawyers
of money to contribute" - get this - "in part because the
u'""'" and her colleagues
enormously increased the
individuals to recover substantial damages
insurance companies and taxpayers. Plaintiffs' lawyers
at least a
of each judgment...."
has been
He
ultimately that "Chief
a dedicated
the
Do you
the picture? The picture is th~s: .
. the cases
giving money to the lawyers. The lawyers gtve 1~ back to B.trd, and .the
circle continues. I submit there might be another mterpretatton. It m1ght
chief justice of the California
Court wants to
that
the rights of victims of unsafe products.
''"'"·~'"'"' role in the campaign. But the

J

Notes

New
on
Medsger, 1983, The

Rose Bird and the
New York, New

on
by
Project, Santa '""u"u'"'u'

The

PROFESSOR
is the
hire to
me in a
1uv"'"''"' case before a friendly audience.
going to use the few minutes available to me
to uu'''"'u'"'
death penalty
Although the death cases are not
most """"''"''"~t
part of the Court's work this issue has taken on .enormous
in the public debate because it stands as a dramatic example
fairly be called judicial civil disobedience.
The essential facts can be stated quickly. The death penalty
been
upheld as constitutional by the United States Supreme Court,
the
California
specifically states that the death
does not
violate any provision of our state constitution. We have
statutes in effect since 1977, but they have not been enforced. As
date, the California Supreme Court has decided nearly 60
cases, and has reversed the penalty in all but three. It
misleading, however, to say that the verdicts in even these three cases
have been affirmed because the cases remain in further litigation.
For example, the death sentence in People v. Jackson 1was affifl!led in
1980 - yes, that's 1980 - but the Court has granted further heanngs to
determine whether the verdict in that case is proportionate to the
imposed in thousands of other homicide cases from around
Court has held that such
even
the U.S.
review is not constitutionally required. 2 This Iai·-n::at:.nutg
certain to take many years, and of course new issues will come
by that time that will require further hearings.
The record
Chief Justice Bird in death cases is •un.'"''"'""
noteworthy; she has voted to reverse every death
exception. We are told, however, that we may not draw
lHvn•u"'
conclusion from this record. The Chief Justice and
the current majority deny any intent to impede the death penalty.
are just
to see that it is carried out fairly.
blame for
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lies with
voters who passed the
penalty statute in 1978,
called the
Initiative,
which was
drafted and overbroad.
measure
replaced the
penalty statute enacted by the Legislature which
the California Supreme Court upheld as constitutional by a four-to-three
vote, with
dissenting in 1980. If the voters had left the law
1977 law
been in
attempt to shift the
the electorate
to the record of Chief Justict Rose
reverse every single death verdict under both the
and the 1978
statutes, and on grounds so broad - often in opinions urging the Court
·to go further than it has - that no one familiar
the opinions can
doubt that she would be pitching a shutout even if the Briggs initiative
had never been conceived. It's possible that some other members of the
Court might have voted to affirm more death sentences if the cases had
been tried under the 1977 legislation. But this would mean only that
these additional cases would continue being tied up in further review on
the proportionality issue along with People v. Jackson.
I freely concede that the Briggs Initiative was poorly drafted and
should never have been passed. The initiative was particularly foolish
because it played into the hands of a set of justices who were already
committed to preventing the death penalty from being carried out. In
fact, the controversial parts of the Briggs Initiative gave prosecutors
very little of any real value.
Consider the most important of the so-called "defects" in the Briggs
Initiative, the provision that made killings committed in the perpetration
of certain dangerous felonies eligible for the death penalty without a
requirement that the jury find the defendant actually intended to kill
somebody. The California Supreme Court decided in 1983 that intent
ought to be required and has reversed dozens ofpre-1983 death verdicts
because of the absence of this intent instruction. In all these cases the
evidence that the defendant intended to kill was overwhelming, and the
verdicts would have been the same if the intent instruction had been
given. A problem exists only because the California Supreme Court
waited five years before telling the prosecutors that it was necessary to
give the instruction and then applied the new rule retroactively to all the
cases pending on appeal. Despite the state constitution's express
command that a judgment may not be reversed for procedural error
unless a miscarriage of justice resulted, the Court majority has strained
mightily to find some way to justify finding that failure to give the
instruction was always prejudicial. I could give any number of
examples - my favorite is People v. Fuentes, 3 where Chief Justice Bird
speculated that the robber might have shot the Brinks guard five times at
short range because he wanted to make the guard drop the money bag,
not to kill him.
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(Laughter)
In another case,
majority speculated that a contract killer who
executed three persons, pausing to reload the shotgun each time in
between, might have lacked criminal intent because he used drugs. 4
Anyone who doubts that Chief Justice Bird has been exploiting
opportunities to "stonewall" the public on capital punishment should
study the
1985 decision in People v. Brown, 5 where the
Court
death sentence of a man who kidnapped, raped and
murdered a 15-year-old
on her way to school. The majority
reversed because the trial court gave a standard instruction asking the
jury not to "be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy,
compassion, prejudice, public opinion or public feelings." This
platitudinous instruction is on the whole to the benefit of the defense
and automatic reversal on this basis is absurd, but I'm pursuing a
different point.
One of the penalty issues argued in all the Briggs Initiative cases is
that the standard penalty instruction is defective because it uses the
word "shall" rather than "may," and thus fails adequately to convey the
point that a jury has wide-open discretion to show mercy. In the seven
years that the initiative has been in effect, prosecutors have repeatedly
begged the Court to give a decision on the validity of this instruction
and to tell them, or rather to tell the trial courts, what instruction ought
to be given if the statutory one is defective. The Court has again and
again put off these requests, saying it was unnecessary to reach the
"shall instruction" issue because the Court planned to reverse anyway
on other issues like the sympathy instruction. Finally, in People v.
Brown the prosecutors managed to shame the majority into deciding the
question and even into approving an alternate instruction that would
pass muster. Because of this belated action, trial judges no longer have
to guess what instruction the Court wants.
Chief Justice Bird objected to this overdue but welcome action. She
asked why it was necessary for the Court to reach this instruction now.
If the Court could delay giving trial judges guidance on how to instruct
jurors correctly for seven years, why could it not wait seven more? No
doubt Bird's supporters will tell us this is an example of her customary
judicial restraint, refusing to reach constitutional questions
unnecessarily. Nonsense.
(Laughter)
Bird's opinion in People v. Brown is the work of a justice who wants
to make it as hard as possible for the trial courts to do the job right, in
order to make sure the Court does not run out of excuses to reverse
death sentences.
I am not offended by the Court's records in the death cases because I
am an enthusiastic supporter of capital punishment. Althought I am
persuaded that the death penalty is neither immoral nor unconstitutional,
I am impressed by the argument that trying to impose it under present
conditions does more harm than good. I respect persons who oppose
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punishment openly and by honest means, in the Legislature,
public opinion, and even in the judiciary. What I do not respect
is a justice who pretends to acknowledge the principle that it is
ultimately for the public to decide whether the death penalty is legitimate
in California, but who creates an elaborate obstacle course of legal
trickery to make sure that the penalty is never carried out. This strategy
of obstruction by sophistry has predictably brought the Court into
disrepute and it has trivialized the legitimate moral case that can be made
against capital punishment. Instead of debating as we ought to whether life imprisonment is sufficient penalty for persons who commit
horrible murders- we find ourselves debating whether a contract killer
or a robber who fired bullets into his victim at short range lacked the
intent to kill. No wonder support for capital punishment in the public is
skyrocketing.
We've heard much talk about judicial independence in these days, as if
independence meant the inherent right of high court judges to do exactly
as they please. Our California constitution does protect judicial
independence and that independence will be secure as long as the courts
remember that the purpose of independence is to preserve the rule of
law, not to guarantee that we will be ruled by judges.
(Applause)
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Notes
1. People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.3d 264 (1980).
2. After the debate, two well-informed lawyers came to the podium to
tell me that the issue currently being litigated in Jackson is not the broad
issue of "proportionality" but the narrower question of whether there is
any discrimination in the application of the death penalty based on the
race of either the defendant or the victim. The essential point is that the
inquiry involves comparing thousands of cases and many years of
litigation, and the issues to be considered in this comparative review
can be expanded at any time.
3. People v. Fuentes, 40 Cal.3d 629 (1985).
4. People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal.3d 211 (1985). Following the
appointment of Justice Paneli to replace Justice Kaus, the Court granted
a rehearing in this case.
5. People v. Brown, 40 Cal.3d 512, modified, 41 Cal.3d 439 (e)
(1985).

initial premise that I
accountable for the
their ae•cts:ton:s.
concern with holding judges politically "'"'"'uunlau•c;
for the results
decisions is we end up with
justice. Now the suggestion seems to be that that's really a slur on the
~ntegrity of the judges, to suggest that somehow they are
to be
mflue~ced by the fact that politicians are endorsing
or not
endorsmg them based on how they vote in particular cases.
I have every confidence in the integrity of the justices who are now
on the Court. I ~nk they've demonstrated their independence, but, as
on~ of them put 1t rec~nt~y - retired Justice Kaus, "It's hard to ignore the
extstence of a crocodtle m your bathtub." I think even a justice who is
de~oted to the rule of law, even a justice with integrity cannot help but
be mfluenced by the fact that ultimately, his or her performance in office
is not going to be measured by whether they have lived up to the
canons of judicial ethics. It's going to be measured simply by
or not the results of
decisions are popular or unpopular.
Now let me turn to the death penalty for a moment. Professor
Johnson suggests that the consistency of the Chief Justice's voting
rec~~d - 5~ reversals, zero affirmances - somehow gives rise to a
legttlmate mference that she is carrying out some sort of hidden agenda
to preclude the carrying out of the death penalty law in California. I find
great difficulty drawing that kind of inference simply from the results
and I think it gets back to that question of holding the justices politically
accountable for the results. Would Professor Johnson draw the same
inference, for example, with respect to Chief Justice Donald Wright
whose voting record in death penalty cases was 172 reversals, zerd
iJVllHAI~<u.q
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affirmances. I doubt that he would because
at the
that Chief
find
most of those cases,
pn~ceoeJtll which had previously been cuu.•vuu""''"·'
precisely the same thing is
cases, that what the Court is doing is
that's what we want
to do.

Stephen

Barnett

Rebuttal:

WAS saying that I thought the proposed standard .of !'lar~~w
competence--can the judge tum out documents that look hke JUdtctal
opinions?, and so forth--is too narrow. One reason it's too narrow ~s
that it doesn't perform the function of maintaining public confidence m
the judiciary, which is what I think judicial elections are about. Such a
standard is toothless and feckless. As all of us here today know, any
decent lawyer can tum out competent legal arguments, and hence
competent judicial opinions, for any position he or she wants to reach.
Indeed, the justice doesn't have to be a decent lawyer, because.h~ or
she has law clerks and research attorneys who can turn out the opm10ns
if the justice can't.
I think the standard that should apply is what I would call a standard
of competence broadly defined. This standard inclu~es questions such
as: Does the justice have common sense and good Judgment? Has the
justice shown himself or herself to be f~ir-~ind~d ~n?- impartial? Has
the justice shown a due respect for the hm1ts of JUdtctal power, rather
than an undue readiness to write his or her values into the law? I think
for a chief justice the standard has additional elements, because of the
symbolic role, and also the very powerful administrative role, of the
chief justice.
All these elements come down, I think, to the question of public
confidence. It's not a question, as our opponents have been su.ggesting,
simply of agreeing or disagreeing with the result~. Constd~r, f~r
example, Chief Justice Earl Warren. Many people dtsagreed wtth h1s
results. However, in a time of national crisis, after the assassination of
President Kennedy, President Johnson thought that Earl Warren was
the one person in the country who had the public respect and trust
needed to be the head of the assassination commission.
Would anyone seriously claim that Chief Justice Bird has that.kind_of
respect and trust? I think it's essential for the people of Cahfomta,
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Justice.
Notes
L Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Ca1.3d 638 (1982).
2. Legislature v. Reinecke (Reinecke I), 6 Cal.3d 595 (1972).
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Ten years U'-''"-"'v·
" the \:wnrPrnP
that the old
should be
Chief Justice
her,
that the uemc~cr::mc
Republicans should be
was
in
happened
the referendum. But the legislators elected under
course
heavily Democratic, and they came back to
and enacted a
new plan. This time they protected
districts of enough incumbent
Republicans to get a two-thirds vote that protected the plan from a
referendum. Those districts went into effect, giving the Democrats a
lock on the Legislature for the 1980s.
Well, what about this decision?
I think in the first place it quite arguably reflected partisanship by
Chief Justice Bird. But in any event it surely reflected very bad
judgment on Chief Justice Bird's part, and thus a failure of competence
in the broad sense. In this case, of all cases, the Supreme Court should
have remained non-partisan and even-handed and let the parties fight
out the political battle in the political arena. Chief Justice Bird did not
do that. By the barest majority- a four-to-three majority, with Justices
Kaus, Mosk and Richardson dissenting - and with a crucial fourth vote
provided by an associate justice of the Court of Appeal, who was
sitting pro tern under assignment by Chief Justice Bird, Chief Justice
Bird threw the Court behind the Democrats.
The result is not just Democratic control of the Legislature for the
decade. The result is that almost all the incumbents in the Legislature
are locked in. Therefore we don't have much left of electoral politics for
the Legislature in California. Therefore we have initiatives instead. And
therefore, also, we have all the attention focused on this year's judicial
election. The people look for an election where they can make their will
felt.
Thank you.
(Applause)
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Steven H. Shiffrin
Rebuttal:

WE STILL wait with bated breath for Professor Johnson, even in
the .safe!y o~ the last. rebuttal, to tell us what liberal activism is, to tell us
wh.1~h JUStices he m
supports and doesn't support, and we're
walt!ng for Professor Johnson to repudiate
implication that the Chief
Justice has voted to uphold the rights of victims in tort suits in
response to campaign contributions.
'
Finally, in the fading moments of the last rebuttal, from Mr. Barnett
we heard ~bout the telltale case and we heard his standard. Here's his
standard, mven~ed purely out of his imagination. The standard you
"'"'Ju•u rely on 1s "broad confidence in the judiciary." He says Earl
Warren would ~a":e been reele~ted, Earl Warren was appointed to the
Commtsswn, and Ch1ef Justice Bird could not have been
thPrA+..-.ro
Justice Bird must go.
,
Not much. an ~rgument, I think. Chief Justice Bird has had more
!han four mdhon vu~ually unanswered dollars poured into a campaign
m ~n atte~pt to get nd of her. Believe me, if there'd been an election for
~ Chtef Justtce Warren,
never would have gotten the South and the
would have poured in against him. If Professor Bam~tt really
;nants to press. a federal ~nalogy, let's think about what it would be like
1f we had natwnal electwns over Brennan, Rehnquist, Marshall, or
would
be a ~olitical
If it's a nightmare at
,
I
a mghtmare at the California level too.
that s
. . at stake. What is at stake is an attempt to transfonn
poht1cs.
. we have operated essentially on an
~-' .... '""''uu•"''
Justices have been retained. What these two
. want to do is t? substitute a "broad confidence" model or
somethmg
- essentially to
an appointment model an
}n which they'll tell the voters the justices hav~ not
law. We all know that the voters are not going to be
I submit again that it will lead to a bad
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elections process.
What is the "telltale case"? The telltale case is Assembly v.
Deukmejian. 1 He does report that Justice Otto Kaus, one of the most
respected justices, I submit, in the history of any state in the nation, did
dissent in that case. He doesn't tell you, and neither does Professor
Johnson in his pamphlet, that Justice Kaus says, "Obviously much is to
be said on each side of the only issue that divides the majority and
Justice Richardson's dissent which I have signed." What was the
issue? The Democrats had passed a plan, joined by many Republicans
in the Legislature, and the Governor had signed that plan. The choice
was, do we use that plan, or do we use the last decade's plan, despite
its violation of the one person-one vote rule? Professor Barnett says that
the Reinecke precedent2 was not quite "on all fours." He's absolutely
right. In the Reinecke case, no plan had been adopted by both the
Legislature and the governor. The governor had vetoed the plan. It
would never have gone into effect; therefore, there was no new plan,
and so the Court went with the old plan.
I think Justice Kaus is right; Deukmejian was a close case. But
Professor Barnett's suggestion that the appointment of the pro tern
justice was a partisan affair is unsupportable. I invite you to read an
article that appeared in the University of San Francisco Law Review. 3 It
concludes that "the charge that the Chief Justice assigns pro tern justices
in order to influence the judicial process lacks any evidentiary support."
The article points out that in the close cases about half the pro tern
justices have gone with the Chief Justice and half against, 15 to 14 .
Now, as to the death penalty, Professor Johnson says in his pamphlet
that he thinks there was no intent requirement in the the law. The district
attorneys go further; they say the intent requirement was "concocted."
As the Carlos 4 decision recognizes, however, the ballot pamphlet
clearly shows the existence of an intent requirement. Johnson
complains that the intent requirement was declared retroactive in
Garcia. 5 Of course, it is retroactive; it was always a part of the law.
Here is what the ballot pamphlet said in response to the opponents'
charge there was no intent requirement:
"ALRIGHT, LET'S TALK ABOUT FALSE ADVERTISING.
"The opposition maintains if someone were to lend a screwdriver to
his neighbor and the neighbor used it to commit a murder the poor
lender could get the death penalty, even though 'he had NO
INTENTION that anyone be killed.'
"Please turn back and read Section 6b ... .it says the person must have
INTENTIONALLY aided in the commission of a murder to be subject
to the death penalty under this initiative." 6
It wasn't concocted. It wasn't invented. It was in the ballot pamphlet
that every voter read. Unfortunately, the ballot pamphlet wasn't written
into the penal code so judges were not instructing juries about the intent
requirement. Professor Johnson says the California Supreme Court
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should not be remanding these cases; the justices .should make their
own ad hoc judgments as to whether or not there ts enough proof of
intention. Some of these cases are close, but for the ~ourt to say that
before a person goes to the death chamber we want a JUry to fin? al~ of
the elements of the special circumstance i~ a rea~onable determu?-anon.
In fact, there will be no future cases hke thts b~cause. the. mtent
requirement is now firmly fixed in the mind of every judge m thts state.
All right, Professor Johnson, now w~ want to kn?w: whom do you
support, what's a liberal activist, and wlll you repudtate your statement
on contributions?

Phillip E. Johnson
Rebuttal:

(Applause)

Notes
1. Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal.3d 638 (1982).

2. Legislature v. Reinecke, 6 Ca1.3d 595 (1972).
3. "A Study of Justice Pro Tempore Assignments i~ the. California
Supreme Court," by Stephanie Wildman, 20 Umverstty of San
Francisco Law Review 1 ( 1985).
4. Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.3d 131 (1983).
5. People v. Garcia, 35 Cal.3d 539 (1984).
6. Carlos, at 144.
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resist the temptation to let Shiffrin define my agenda for me.
know, this a very different event from what I anticipated last Fall
when the State Bar convention passed resolutions urging local bar
associations to sponsor educational programs about the judicial election.
I believe that what was contemplated at that time was not an educational
campaign, but a propaganda campaign. Members of the public had been
saying: "These opinions don't make any sense to me, and these justices
are doing these things that seem irrational. I cannot understand their
reasoning, but lawyers tell me that this is just because I haven't had a
legal education, and if I did I'd approve of what the Court has been
doing and it would all make sense to me." The bar establishment's
position seemed to be emerging as: (1) The only legitimate issue is
competence; (2) any justice is competent who has the ability to write an
opinion that gives a legal justification for what he or she wants to do;
(3) members of the public can't judge competence because they do not
have the necessary education; (4) the public therefore has to rely upon
the Bar leaders who will tell them that all the justices are inherently
competent; (5) therefore everybody has to vote "yes" on all the justices.
Today we've gotten something very different from that kind of
propaganda effort. We've had a full-fledged debate on the merits. That
a debate of this kind has occurred on this occassion is in itself a victory
for those of us who are critical of the Court, whatever might be the vote
on retention in this audience.
I felt from the start that I could not allow the kind of "educational
campaign" that Court supporters originally contemplated to occur
unopposed if there was any way that I could direct attention to the
substantive issues that are legitimately involved in this campaign. I've
been teaching law for nearly 20 years now, specializing in the subjects
with which the California Supreme Court most frequently deals:
criminal law, criminal procedure, torts and professional responsibility.
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Over the years, I have become convinced that the decisions of the Court
have been increasingly politicized and result-oriented. But even more
than that, the decisions have simply been unwise. They've failed to take
into account practical problems, and have loaded the system of justice
with more and more hearings that accomplish little. This excess of
legalism does not produce more justice; it produces more obstruction,
more waste, and more inefficiency. I believe that the Court has become
increasingly remote from an understanding of the experience of
ordinary citizens, of victims and even of ordinary lawyers.
Some of the areas in which I disapprove of the Court's performance
involve good faith disagreement, or a degree of incompetence at worst,
but in other areas I believe there has been something more than that. I
believe I have I have identified outright misconduct in the
reapportionment cases and the death penalty cases, both of which are
covered in detail in my pamphlet. If what has been done in these areas
doesn't make sense to the public, it doesn't make sense to me either.
Should we consider only "competence," meaning the ability to justify
a decision with a legalistic argument? A good lawyer can write a good
legalistic argument to justify practically anything. I well remember the
day when I was called into the office of a very, very famous judge who
said: "We justices have voted to decide this case in a certain way, based
on the statute, and I want you to write the opinion." I replied, "But
Chief, the statute says the exact opposite of what you are deciding." He
said, "I know it does, but I'm sure you'll think of something to justify
our decision." And I did.
(Laughter)
A good law clerk takes pride in the ability to come up with a plausible
justification for whatever a judge might want to do. He can't always tell
very much about how a justice arrives at decisions by reading his or her
opinions.
The crucial thing we pay state Supreme Court justices to do is to
exercise judgment, and I think that the difference between good
judgment and bad judgment is what this debate really ought to be about.
I will not talk about the justices otherthan Chief Justice Rose Bird. I
have opinions about all of them, and I'm not concealing those opinions,
but for one hour one justice is enough. There are objections to be made
about several justices, but Chief Justice Bird stands out, in my
opinion, as having exceptionally poor judgment. The way she has
managed her campaign is evidence of that, the judicial hearings that
Professor Barnett referred to are evidence of that, and the pattern of her
decisions provides the most important evidence. That at any rate is my
conclusion, but in the end I am only a single voter, just like you. But at
least we've put the issue to the voters on the substantive issues,
because the performance of the Court is a legitimate subject of
controversy and the constitution gives the voters the right to pass their
judgment. Thank you.
(Applause)
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